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ARTICLES

The Juror's Need to Know vs. The
Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial
Leonard Pertnoy*
I.

Introduction

The right to a fair trial is a guarantee so fundamental that it
was specifically accounted for by the Constitution itself.' Even prior
to becoming an enumerated concern of the nation's charter, the right
to a fair trial was well-established as a norm of ordered liberty.'
Consistent with that status, Justice Frankfurter observed that "the
fair administration of justice is one of the chief tests of a true
*
Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. University of Louisville [B.A., 1962]; University of Vienna, Austria [A.B., 1965]; University of Miami School
of Law [J.D., 1969]. Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. The right to a fair trial is secured at the federal level by the Fifth Amendment to the
effect that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law," U.S. CONST., amend. V, and at the state level by the Fourteenth Amendment provision to the effect that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." Id., amend. XIV. The right to a fair trial is facilitated by other
constitutional provisions including the grand jury requirement for a "capital, or otherwise infamous crime," id., amend. V; protection against double jeopardy, id.; immunity against selfincrimination, id; the right to a speedy and public trial and impartial jury, id., amend. VI; a
right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," id.; the opportunity to confront witnesses and have compulsory process for obtaining them," id.; and the right to "Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
2. Chief Justice Burger, noted that "[tihe origins of the proceeding which has become
the modern criminal trial in Anglo American justice can be traced back beyond reliable historical records." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980).
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democracy."'

Modern perimeters of the right to a fair trial primarily are a
function of the judiciary's power "to say what the law is."" Especially over the course of the twentieth century, as individual rights
and liberties have commanded increasing attention from the Su-

preme Court, the right to a fair trial has developed an increasingly
rich and complex history. The Court itself has "start[ed] with the
premise that the right of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way lies at the foundation of our system of government." 5
Critical to the reality of a fair trial, therefore, is management of the
process itself.
An extensive collection of rules and decisions concerning access,6 evidence,7 procedure, 8 availability of counsel, 9 standards of review,"0 questions of contempt" and other issues comprises the law as

relevant to fair trial interests. Ordinarily, the right to a fair trial is
viewed in relation to a significant competing interest. From the necessary balancing that results, the tension between fair trial imperatives and rival constitutional or other interests is resolved.1 2 Analysis
is more complicated when uncertainty exists with respect to whether
a practice facilitates or impairs fairness of process. Typifying evalua-

tive difficulty is the question of juror note-taking and juror-questioning. Advocates of such practice maintain that increased jury participation would maintain our Democratic tradition of citizen
participation and improve the accuracy of the decision-making process, thereby enhancing the credibility of the jury and legitimizing
the verdict. This theory of juror responsibility can be viewed as mandated by the due process clause which would serve to avoid errone-

ous jury decision-making.13 Critics complain that jury participation

3. Pennakamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
5. Wood v. Georgia, 370. U.S. 375, 383 (1962).
6. See Glove-Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (finding that the
First Amendment established a right of public access to criminal trial proceedings).
7. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
8. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating a gag order
imposed to limit prejudicial pretrial publicity).
9. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting standards for determining whether the right to counsel is compromised).
10. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding that the guilt of criminal
defendant must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt).
11. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (reversing contempt conviction of
newspaper which criticized judge in editorial).
12. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (balancing interests of free press
against disruption caused by media's activity at trial).
13. J.C. Smith, Case and Comment: R.V. Flack, 1985 CraM. L. REV. 148, 160 (1985);
United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979).

THE JUROR'S NEED TO KNOW

precludes their role as an independent fact-finder and is inherently a
14
denial of due process and the right to a fair trial.
Irrespective of the ongoing debate, the practical result is that
litigants may lose everything they own. For example, consider if a
bank and large developer convinced a litigant to take out a loan to
invest the proceeds in a new strip mall. The market soured, and the
same bank and large developer that assured the litigant that her investment was safe, later foreclosed on everything she owned. She decided to make a multiple court claim against the bank and developer. After two years of discovery and two failed settlement
discussions, the case has just been tried, and today the jury gets instructions and begins deliberation. The jury must somehow digest
and synthesize two weeks of testimony about promissory notes and
deception. Looking at the jury as they are about to determine the
course of a lifetime, the litigant and her attorney must wonder how
it is possible for the jury to make its decision based on an educated
review of the testimony. The jurors sat through sixty hours of testimony, most of it complex, some of it subtle. Not once were the jurors allowed to ask a question of any witness or to take notes during
the trial.
As another illustration, consider a drug freighter trial underway
in the criminal courthouse. Twenty-seven Chilean crew men and one
passenger fill five rows in the spectators' gallery. They are wearing
crisp new white and light blue shirts, they sit watching the trial
while each man wears headphones piping a simultaneous spanish
translation. Their lawyers, twenty-eight in number hired by the ships
owners, sit elbow to elbow and are heard to comment that "this is
ridiculous" and "this is a nightmare." The defendants are comprised
of the entire crew of the five-hundred foot freighter and one man
who claims to be an indigent columbian stow away. The ship was
seized by a Coast Guard cutter which was on patrol to interdict Haitians heading for the United States. Authorities found more than five
tons of cocaine valued at 60,000,000 hidden in the cargo of powdered zinc. It is said to be one of the largest maritime cocaine
seizures in U.S. history. The Coast Guard arrested everyone aboard
charging them with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy and attempted importation of drugs. The trial is expected to
14. See Wiehl, After 2000 Years, The Silent Terror Learns to Talk, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
1989. See DeBenedeito v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985).
In DeBenedeito the court was concerned with the potential danger of juror bias and nonobjectivity coupled with the disruption of order and procedures.
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last a minimum of eight weeks. Each of the twenty-eight defense
lawyers is entitled to cross-examine each witness, each cross-examination relating to different defendants in different charges. There are
no two defendants against whom the evidence is the same other than
the fact they were on the boat.
How are jurors suppose to keep each of the sets of facts separate and give each defendant his own determination of guilt or innocence? The constitution guarantees each defendant the right to have
15
the jury consider only the evidence specifically against him.
Juror non-participation serves as more than a technicality or
convenience. Because jurors generally are not allowed to ask questions of witnesses in the American legal system, the quality of jury
deliberations is suspect. This is even more serious given the complexities and subtleties in the evidence of complex criminal cases and
civil law suits.1 6 The integrity of one of the most important components of American jurisprudential theory -

the jury -

suffers be-

cause jurors possess no rational means of developing the evidence on
their own in order to better understand and methodically analyze the
evidence as a means of reaching a just verdict.
In adversary proceedings, courts must balance the benefits and
prejudices of trial practices and procedures among attorney, witness,
litigants, juror and judicial system, in the search for truth. This article examines the jurisprudential question of whether jurors should be
permitted to ask questions of witnesses, and take notes during a trial.
Throughout, the article balances practical considerations with constitutional requirements and suggests that juror participation enhances
a more rational and just decision-making process.
II.

Background

No federal statute or constitutional interpretation addresses the
question of juror note-taking and juror questioning of witnesses.
Therefore, in order to examine both the constitutional and practical
affect on the jury trial and fairness of the verdict, one must first look
at how jurisdictions have addressed the issues of juror note-taking
and juror questioning of witnesses.
15. See United States v. Yerco Huerta Rojas, 801 F. Supp. 644 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
16. See In Re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980). In this case the pretrial discovery alone took over nine years to complete and
involved millions of documents and more than one thousand pages of depositions.
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A.

Juror Note Taking

The practice of note-taking by jurors during trial varies extensively among state courts. Note-taking has been an issue in mistrial
efforts since at least before the turn of this century, and court
records document the practice as early as 1770. In pre-revolutionary
America, trials were conducted with extreme haste usually lasting
one day or less. At the same time, there were no specific procedures
in place for the accurate transcription of the trial proceedings. The
rapidity of trial and absence of any formal record resulted in jurors
often taking notes for deliberative review.1 7
Indiana, in 1859, took a stand against jury note-taking
in Cheek
v. State.18 In relying on a statement taken from Buirrell Circumstantial Evidence (2d ed) 1859, p. 108, the court held that jurors were
not to take notes but were to register the evidence on the "tablets of
their memory." 19 Seven years later, the Court in Cheek would again
restrain jurors: In Patterson v. State,2 0 a juror was instructed that
note-taking during trial was improper and to discontinue it. The
Bench ordered the juror instead to depend on memory."
Courts have regularly considered certain factors in determining

whether to allow note-taking by jurors. 2 The decision turns on how
prejudicial and injurious to the parties the note-taking is likely to
be.2 3 A court would not grant a new trial solely on the basis that a

juror's note was inaccurate, unless counsel could also show its use
produced significant injury. 4
In accord, many other states refused to allow jurors to take
17. See generally, HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE, chs. 18 and 19 (1970).
18. 35 Ind. 492 (1871). The Court instructed the jury not to take notes. Two jurors
continued to do so and a new trial was granted.
Held: It was well calculated to divert the attention the jurors, while they were
busy, pencil or pen in hand, from the evidence as it would naturally be progressing while such notes were being made. The juror is to register the evidence, as it
is given, on the tablets of his memory, and not otherwise.
19. Id. at 495.
20. 63 Ind. 531 (1878).
21. Id. at 536.
22. State v. Jump, 619 A.2d 602, 609 (N.J. 1993); State v. Triplett, 421 S.E.2d 511,
519 (W. Va. 1992); State v. Williams, 610 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Ohio 1992); Wash v. State, 521
So.2d 890, 897 (Miss. 1988); U.S. v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986).
23. Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. Creighton, 69 N.W. 766 (Neb. 1897), involved a fire insurance policy and its coverage on a large number of articles and values placed on them. The trial
court did not commit error by allowing the jury to take notes on the evidence presented concerning the articles. See also Brooks v. Temple Lumber Co., 105 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Koontz v. Mylius, 77 W. Va. 499, 87 S.E. 851 (W. Va. 1916).
24. State v. Keehn, 118 P. 851 (Kan. 1911). An inaccurate sketch of the murder scene
was used by a juror during deliberation.

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SUMMER

1993

notes of facts and issues raised by the attorneys in argument.2 5 Upon
objection from opposing counsel a request for jury note-taking during argument was not allowed.2 One of the early states to consent to
note-taking by jurors was Rhode Island. In State v. Cottrell, Rhode
Island's highest court affirmed the trial court and authorized notetaking by jurors. 27 Other states did not find note-taking a prohibited
or illegal practice, but also did not feel it to be a commendable one.
Rather, they felt it should be left to the discretion of the court.2 8
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in 1897,
in Agnew v. United States,29 where a juror asked permission to take
notes and the trial judge granted the request, stating, "[y]ou have a
right to assist your memory in any way that is consistent with your
conscience.""0 The Court, however, went on to caution the jury that
any notes taken were for personal convenience and were not to be
used in reaching a verdict. The court in Agnew disposed of the case
on procedural grounds, thereby avoiding the constitutionality of the
note-taking issue.3a
As courts became more and more familiar with the practice of
jury note-taking and questioning of witnesses, the weight of authority among both state and federal courts was to leave the right of jury
note-taking to the discretion of the Courts.32 Each state was to assess
the issue of jury note-taking on a case by case basis. For example, in
Tennessee, the court in United States v. Davis,3 though against
note-taking by jurors, held it to be within the discretion of the court
absent a controlling statute.
In the early 1940s the jury system came under attack, and critics proposed substituting alternative methods of dispute resolution
25. Indianapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Miller, 71 Ill.
463 (1874); Ettelsohn v. Kirkwood, 33
Ill. App. 103 (1889). The attorney should not have the right to request that jurors take notes
during argument.
26. Cahill v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 98 A. 235 (Md. 1916).
27. State v. Cottrell, 37 A. 947 (R.I. 1886). During a criminal trial the jury foremen
took notes and used them to report the evidence to a newspaper. The court held no error had
occurred.
28. Commonwealth v. Tucker, 76 N.E. 127 (Mass. 1905), Gipson v. Commonwealth,
118 S.W. 334 (Ky. 1909).
29. 165 U.S. 36 (1897).
30. Id. at 45.
31. The note-taking issue has never reached a Constitutional impasse because the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the issue.
32. United States v. Polowichak, et al, 783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1980); Toles v. United States, 308 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1962);
Harris v. United States, 261 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Campbell, 138 F.
Supp. 344 (N.D. Iowa, W.D. 1956).
33. 103 F. 457 (W.D. Tenn. 1900).
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such as arbitration.

4

Simultaneously, the judicial conference of the

United States began to investigate ways to improve the jury system.

The conference considered the matter of jurors asking questions and
taking notes, and concluded by recommending both.35 The national
movement to improve the judicial system, and the efficiency of the

jury trial was acknowledged by District Judge Moscowitz in United
6 In its appeal the defense stated that one ground
States v. Carlisi."

for a new trial was that on two occasions a juror had taken notes.
Judge Moscowitz stated, "[tlheir is no legal reason why notes should

not be made by jurors. Judges and lawyers make notes, why not jurors?" 3 He reasoned that note-taking would assist the juror's ability
to recollect, and would enable a more intelligent consideration of
what is remembered. This would create a more efficient jury. Judge
Moscowitz could see that this was a time of rapid growth in the legal
environment and in the complexity of both civil and criminal trials.

"The Courts" his opinion concludes "should make progress with the
times.""
In 1964, the North Carolina Supreme Court, observing that
judges and lawyers take notes during complicated trials, held that

the trial judge did not err in dispensing pads to the jury during the
charging conference in a case involving eight bill of indictments with
a number of counts with separate offenses on different dates and
times.3 9 By 1970, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Dudley v. State,40
reversed it's earlier position on note-taking and held that "minor
note-taking for the purpose of supporting the juror's memory . . . is
reasonable and certainly should not be disapproved." 4 1 The trend to-

ward increasing juror involvement was clearly under way. Today the
clear weight of authority in the federal system is that jury note-tak42
ing is a matter within the trial judges discretion.
34. The Jury System in the Federal Courts: Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 26 F.R.D. 409, 417 (1960).
35. Id. at 48 and 424, 457-59. In recommendation XX, the conference stated the trial
judge should have discretion in permitting note taking by the jurors.
36. 32 F. Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). This case had twenty nine defendants in a
criminal case of illegal spirits.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. State v. Goldberg, 134 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 1964).
40. Dudley v. State, 263 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. 1970).
41. Id. at 163.
42. United States v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Johnson,
584 F.2d 148, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 707 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Braverman, 522 F.2d 218, 224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975); Goodloe v.
United States, 188 F.2d 621, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951); see
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B. Juror Questioning of Witnesses
The belief that a jury must play an active role in gathering facts
is not a new one. When jurors had not received enough facts to understand the evidence or make a determination, it has always been
the task of the jury to collect more facts as best it could.43 This

concept began as early as the days of the inquisition in England."
As the years passed, however, the concept of an active jury became
unpopular and the trend turned more passive with the judge carrying
the burden of determining that a proper verdict was reached.4 5
While trial by jury was a constitutional right given to us by the

colonists to protect our individual liberty,"" the function of the jury
system was not documented until, as earlier noted, the 1940s when
the matter of jury efficiency was being considered. At that time

courts began to improve juror efficiency by increasing the potential
for jurors' understanding of the evidence during trial. A judge may
question a witness when the judge is confused or when she thinks
7
there is a need to clarify facts for the jury to prevent injustice.'
Members of grand juries frequently interrogate witnesses in an attempt to decide whether or not to indict. Appellate court judges testing the boundaries of a novel legal theory may be said to serve the

same function as questioning by jurors.
Although no state provides for juror questioning by statute, a
number of courts have permitted it. Most courts considering the pro-

priety of juror questioning conclude that it is not improper, but is a
also, People v. DiLuca 448 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
Judge Learned Hand's discretionary approach has been the one followed since 1950. In
United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1950), Hand cites the cases "condemning"
juror note-taking, United States v. Davis, 163 F. 457, aff'd, 107 F. 753 (6th Cir. 1901), and
approving of juror note-taking, Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Kelly, 84 F.2d 569,
576 (8th Cir. 1936) and United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp 479, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). It
was concluded that juror note-taking is a matter of discretion. In a later case, United States v.
Marquez, 449 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1971), the court stated (relying on Chiarella): "It has been
well established in this circuit that it is within the trial court's discretion to allow the jury to
take notes." Id. at 93.
43. Dragan D. Petroff, The Practice of Jury Note Taking-Misconduct Right, or Privilege?, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 125, 126 (1965). Petroff stated that the jury must be more than just a
trier of fact. They were collectors, gatherers of information. He states that in the 19th Century
jurors were allowed to ask questions. Id. at 127.
44. Lisa M. Harms, Questioning of Witnesses, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 127, n.47 (1977).
45. Id.
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
47. Federal Rules of Evidence 614(b) provides guidance for federal judges, while state
judges resort to case law. People v. Corrigan, 310 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1957); State v. Monroe, 236
A.2d 471 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967); People v. Palmer, 189 N.E.2d 265 (Il.2d 1963); Watson v.
State, 190 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1966) (stating that in order to get the truth, avoid error, and
protect the rights of an accused, one should give the jury the benefit of all available and
admissible evidence.)

THE JUROR'S NEED TO KNOW
48
matter within the discretion of the trial judge.
The Supreme Court has yet to pass on the constitutionality of
juror questioning, therefore the issue remains at the appellate level
where it has received favorable treatment. In one of the earliest decisions on the issue, the second Circuit in United States v. Witt,4"
stated; "[W]e think that [juror questioning] is a matter within the
[trial] judge's discretion, like witness questioning by the judge himself." Certainly the most ringing endorsement of juror questioning
came from United States v. Callahan,5" where the court stated;

There is nothing improper about the practice of allowing occasional questions from jurors to be asked of witnesses. If a juror
is unclear as to a point in the proof, it makes good common
sense to allow a question to be asked about it. If nothing else,
the question should alert trial counsel that a particular factual
issue may need more extensive development. Trials exist to develop truth. It may sometimes be that counsel are so familiar
with a case that they fail to see problems that would naturally
bother a juror who is presented with the facts for the first time.
In the most recent case that dealt with the juror questioning issue,
the 4th Circuit in DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,51
again validated the idea of juror questioning, but declined to adopt a
bright-line rule because of its' potential pitfalls.
One principal argument many attorneys have expressed on this
development is the dilemma an attorney may find herself in: by objecting the attorney runs the risk of offending the juror who posed
the questions, and by not objecting the attorney may do the client a
disservice." In fact, a number of arguments have been advanced
that such a procedure might even be detrimental to jury
functioning."
In state jurisdictions as early as 1920, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Boggs v. Jewell Tea Co.,5 citing Wallace v. Keystone Automobile Co.,5 5 recognized that "even jurors may ask ques48. Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Propriety of Jurors Asking Questions in Open
Court During Course of Trial, 31 A.L.R.3d 872 (1970).
49. 215 F.2d 580,584 (2d Cir. 1954).
50. 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979).
51. 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985).
52. Maris v. Crummey, Inc., 204 P. 259 (Cal. App. 1921).
53. Heaver & Peisrod, Trial Lawyers in the Box? Jurors question Witness, THE
DOCKET, Fall 1989.
54. 109 A. 666 (Pa. 1920).
55. 86 A. 699 (Pa. 1913).
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tions."" It was this reasoning, expressed again in United States v.
Rosenburg,57 that was the foundation for the court in United States
v. Witt" to allow jurors to put questions to witnesses. The state of
Florida recognized the right of jurors to ask questions in Ferrera v.
State,5 where the Court held that "upon appropriate occasion a
trier of fact might be completely justified in propounding a question." 60 The State of Arkansas, in Ratton v. Busby, "1 found that "it
has been -held not to be an error to permit questions by the jurors
concerning matters that might properly have been elicited on the direct examination of the witness if they are such as tend to clarify
material points in the testimony." 62 The Supreme Court of Michi8 found that the
gan, in People v. Heard,"
trial court erred in ruling
that under no circumstances could jurors ask questions of witnesses
in a criminal matter.
Now the jury system is in a second generation of movement toward an active approach in the search for truth. Jurors are no longer
satisfied with lying back and accepting only the evidence counsel
presents or closing arguments as true summations of the case. In
response, Judges are increasingly permitting jurors to ask questions
and take notes in a number of jurisdictions around the country.
Presently, twenty-two states have statutes or supreme court
rules that explicitly allow juror note-taking within the trial judge's
discretion." Ten of these states simply allow juror note-taking, while
the remaining twelve states explicitly encourage the practice.6 5 There
are only four states that have explicitly proscribed juror note-taking.6 6 Despite the attention these procedures are receiving, however,
the scarcity of published research indicates that few states have un56. Boggs, 109 A. at 668.
57. 195 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1952) (finding that it is the duty of the judge to see that
a case on trial is presented in such a way as to be understood by the jury).
58. 215 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1954) (allowing juror questions to witness at the discretion of the judge).
59. 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958).
60. Id. at 801.
61. 326 S.W.2d 889 (Ark. 1959).
62. Id. at 898.
63. 200 N.W.2d 73 (Mich. 1972).
64. M. Frankel, Judge Frankel on Jurors Questioning Witnesses, 60 Wis. BAR BULL.,
Dec. 1987 at 23-24; W.D. Wolfson, An Experiment in Juror Interrogation of Witnesses,

C.B.A. REC., Feb. 12-17 (1987).
65. The following states explicitly allow juror note taking within the trial judges discretion: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Utah and Washington.
66. These states are Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Texas and Vermont. This information was
provided by telephone from the Center for Jury Studies, National Center for State Courts.
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dertaken a thorough investigation of the contribution these procedures make and whether they enhance the effectiveness of jury
performance.
III.

The Process

Whether or not jurors may constitutionally participate in the
trial, the process utilized for jury participation must also meet constitutional standards. This process must afford litigants due process
and a fair trial and it must maintain a balance between the attorney's ability to control the trial and the juror's need for more information. As we have seen, the majority leaves to the discretion of the
trial judge, the handling of jury questions and note-taking during
trial proceedings.1 7 However, the manner in which judges handle this
process, including whether and when jury instructions are issued,
varies with each court.
Proper handling of juror questions was addressed in United
States v. Witt,68 where the court simply stated that its use was in the
sound discretion of the trial judge. The court reasoned that jurors
asking questions was analogous to the questioning of a witness by the
judge himself and was therefore permissible pursuant to Rule 614(b)
of the of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 This comparison, however,
is misleading. One cannot compare questioning by a judge, who is
trained in the law, to questioning by jurors, who likely are untrained
in the law, and in many cases, have never been exposed to a legal
environment other than the time which they spend as a juror.7
Soon after the Witt decision, additional problems arose in the
handling of juror-questioning. In State v. Martinez,71 the trial judge
invited and encouraged the jurors, after retiring to deliberate, to ask
questions of a person who was not called as a witness by either the
prosecution or the defense. In response the jurors asked more than
fifty questions of that witness. The Supreme Court of Utah found
this procedure to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 2
67. United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1954).
68. Id.
69. The court drew this concept from the opinion in United States v. Rosenberg, 195
F.2d 583, 593-594 (2d Cir. 1952). In Rosenberg, it was stated the judge was to pose questions
to clear up any misunderstood facts. The judge is the only disinterested lawyer. His interest is
only to see that justice is done by the development of the facts and their understanding by the
jury. See also De Benedetto v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985).
70. De Benedetto, 754 F.2d at 512.
71. 326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958).
72. Id. at 103.
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The Supreme Court of Indiana in Carter v. State,7 held that
although the trial court should not encourage juror-questioning, it
was error to forbid juror-questioning by way of a preliminary instruction. Eleven years later in Tyson v. State, however, the Supreme Court of Indiana found no reversible error when the trial
judge both encouraged juror questioning and invited counsel objection to the same so that the propriety of such a procedure would be
addressed in the event of appeal. 7
In De Benedetto v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,7 the
Court's procedure was for jurors to give the questions to the trial
judge by asking them aloud in the courtroom for all to hear, then a
determination was made as to their admissibility. Rejected questions,
though not answered, were to be heard by all jurors. The court found
no prejudice to either .party, but cautioned that "the practice of juror
questioning is fraught with dangers that can undermine the orderly
progress of the trial to verdict. '' 76 How much influence the unanswered questions had on the jury is unknown. Although the court
instructed the jury on the inadmissability of an improper question or
response, it is impossible to determine if such an instruction undoes
the prejudicial effect of the procedure. Handling questions in this
way leads to the only proper remedial step: declaration of a
mistrial."
7 8
A different procedure was used in United States v. Callahan,
where, before opening statements, the trial judge told the jury that if
they should have any questions regarding a witness' testimony they
should write them down and pass them to the judge, and if the question was a proper one, the judge would ask it of the witness. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit found no error in this procedure, adding
that "there is nothing improper about the practice of allowing an
occasional question from jurors to be asked of a witness."'7 9 The
court cautioned that its opinion was not an endorsement of any particular procedure, but rather, that a court must strike a balance between the value obtained by allowing juror questions versus the possible abuses.
In 1990 the United States Court of Appeals in the Eighth Cir73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

234 N.E.2d 650 (Ind. 1968).
386 N.E.2d 1185, 1192 (Ind. 1979).
754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 516.
Id.
588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1086.
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cuit was confronted with the matter of how jury questions should be
handled in criminal trials.80 In both United States v. Land 11 and
United States v. Polowichak,82 questions were propounded by jurors

during the trial, prior to any ruling on the propriety of the question.
The Eighth Circuit in Land disapproved of the practice, but found
insufficient harm so as to justify a mistrial. In United States v.
Gray,8" just nine months later, the Eighth Circuit upheld its decision
in Land. Quoting the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Polowichak,8"
the Court required that juror questions be submitted to the bench in
writing before being read aloud at trial. Nonetheless, the Court followed its earlier decision and looked to see whether harmful
prejudice would result from the practice rather than whether the
practice itself is improper.8"

In at least one jurisdiction, Georgia, jury questioning is forbidden. In State v. Williamson,86 the trial court instructed the jury
before commencing the trial that they were permitted to ask questions of the witnesses or of the court. Upon review, the Supreme
Court of Georgia stated that "the practice of permitting jurors to
directly question witnesses is a dangerous one. Jurors are not
schooled in the rules of evidence which govern the posing of questions in a trial and are likely to be personally offended if their ques' The court in reliance on Hall v. State,88
tions are objected to."87
found the practice of juror questioning to be objectionable. The
Court cautioned that objections to such practice must be made or
they will be deemed to have been waived.

Although in most jurisdictions note-taking by jurors during a
proceeding is in the discretion of the courts,8 9 several problems have
80. United States v. Gray, 897 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1990).
81. 877 F.2d 17 (8th Cir. 1989).
82. 783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986).
83. 897 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1990).
84. "[The district court should require jurors to submit questions in writing, without
disclosing the questions to other jurors, where upon the court may pose the question in its
original or restated form upon ruling the question or the substance of the question proper."
Gray, 897 F.2d at 1429 (citing Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410 at 413).
85. The Court stated that if it sat as a trial court, it would hesitate to permit jury
questions because of the dangers stated in De Benedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754
F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985), but if it did it would do so as indicated in Polowichak, 183 F.2d at
410.
86. 279 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. 1981).
87. Id. at 204.
88. 244 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1978).
89. United States v. Polowichak, 783 F. 2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Rhodes, 631 F. 2d 43 (5th Cir. 1980); Toles v. United States, 308 F. 2d 590 (9th Cir. 1962);
Harris v. United States, 261 F. 2d 792 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Campbell, 138 F.
Supp. 344 (N.D. Iowa W.D. 1956).
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arisen with regard to the procedures to be followed. In United States
v. Riebold,90 following a request by a juror after the majority of jurors indicated that they wished to take notes, the trial judge granted
permission to do so. The judge, however, admonished the jury that
their notes were to be kept confidential. The Tenth Circuit, finding
no error, cited United States v. Marquez9 and stated, "[t]he decision to allow a juror to take notes as well as the procedure used for
such note taking are also matters within the sound discretion of the
District Court." 92 Meanwhile the Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Rhodes,9" found no error where the trial judge had failed to give an
instruction on the use of juror notes during deliberations. In the
Court's opinion, such an instruction should be given. The Court then
gave an example of an appropriate instruction which cautioned the
jury not to allow their note-taking to distract them and, more importantly, that "the notes taken by each juror are to be used only as a
convenience in refreshing that juror's memory and that each juror
should rely on his or her independent recollection of the evidence
'94
rather than be influenced by another juror's notes."
Relying on the Rhodes decision, the Fourth Circuit decided in
United States v. Polowichak et al,95 that jurors would be permitted
to take notes, but they should be instructed that their notes are not
evidence and should not take precedence over the jurors' independent
recollection of the proceedings.9 6 However, the court went on to say
that failure to so instruct was not plain error. 97
A.

Implementation of the Procedures

Courts have not directly addressed the constitutionality of juror
questioning and note taking primarily because the process utilized by
judges in their implementation requires consent of the parties and
includes constitutional safeguards, thereby assuring due process. The
following are some of the safeguards which have been utilized to ensure that all trial participants receive a fair trial:
1. Juror-questioning and note-taking should be allowed only when
all lawyers have agreed in advance to the procedure.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

557 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1977).
449 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1979).
United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 705 (10th Cir. 1977).
631 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 46.
783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 413.
Id.
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2. Jurors should be informed that they have a right to ask questions,
but that they need not do so and that questions should only be asked
if they believe the answer would be important to them as jurors in
the case.
3. If jurors intend to question the witness, they should be required to
put their question in writing and pass them to the judge first to determine admissibility.
4. Questions should not indicate the identity of the asking juror.
5. Jurors should be requested not to discuss their questions with
other jurors before they have been submitted to a witness.
6. Jurors must be informed that the judge may decline to ask certain questions based on the judge's decision concerning the rules of
evidence.
7. Jurors should be told not to be offended if a question .is not asked
and that such a event should not affect their consideration of the
evidence.
8. Lawyers must be afforded the opportunity to object to any juror
question sought to be asked and the jury must be prevented form
learning who objected.
9. After a judge asks the witness a juror's question, each side's lawyer should have an opportunity to ask follow-up questions confined to
the new testimony.
A sample instruction to the jury concerning question-asking is:
The attorney for these parties have agreed that I may permit
you to ask questions to witnesses during this trial. You may do
so under the following arrangements:
After each witness has been examined by counsel, I will ask you
whether you have any questions for that witness. If you do, write
them down on a piece of paper. Do not put your name, juror
number or any other identifying matter on the question. Do not
discuss your questions with your fellow jurors. When you are
finished, pass the paper with your questions to the last juror on
your right hand. The bailiff will collect the questions. I will then
consider the questions and if they are permitted under our rules
of evidence, and are relevant to this testimony, I will consult
with counsel.
If the court and counsel agree that the questions may be properly asked under law, then I will read the question to the witness
myself.
It is important that you understand that if I do not ask one or
more of the questions, because it is not within the rules of evidence or because it is not relevant, that it is no reflection upon
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you. If a question cannot be asked, you must not speculate about
what the answer might be.
It should be noted that questioning witnesses is the primary responsibility of counsel and that jurors should not be encouraged
to ask a large number of questions. Attorneys for the respective
parties know the case better than the jurors. Therefore, you presume that they will attempt to place before you all the evidence
that is needed to assist you in reaching a proper verdict. Questions should only be directed to a witness and not to the lawyers
or the judge. 98
As to juror note taking the judge should be given latitude to
decide what procedure is to be followed during trials, however, her
decision should consider the following constitutional due process
safeguards:
1. If juror note taking is not provided by statute, all lawyers
should agree in advance to the procedure.
2. Jurors should be told that notes are permitted, but not
required.
3. The court should furnish notepads and pencils.
4. The bailiff -will collect all notepads with each adjournment
and will return the notes each time the trial resumes.
5. The notes are confidential.
6. The notes can be taken into the jury room only for
deliberation.
7. Jurors are not to discuss the notes or the trial until
deliberation.
8. The notes themselves should be sparing, because they are
memory refreshers, not sources of fact.
9. Note taking should not distract the jury's attention from the
trial proceedings.
10. Notes are private use and are in no way an official document
or an authority.
11. Notes should hold no greater weight than memory.
12. In deliberation, note-aided and non-note-aided memory are
of equal significance.
A sample instruction encompassing the above constitutional due
process safeguard is:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, the attorneys for the parties
and I have agreed that you may take notes during this trial.
Each of you will be furnished with a pad and pencil so that you
may take notes. Please remember, however, that you are under
98.

James J. Desanto, Improving the Trial Process, ILL. B.J., Nov. 1984, at 166.
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no obligation to take notes. If you want to take notes, bear in
mind that one of your important assignments as a juror is to
observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying to help you
decide if the witness is credible. You must not allow your notetaking to interfere with your observations of the witness. Any
notes you take must be simply for the purpose of refreshing your
memory later rather than to be your ultimate record of the
facts. Do not, therefore, give your notes priority over to your
independent recollection of the evidence. If you choose not to
take notes, you should rely entirely upon your own independent
recollection of the proceedings and you should not be unduly influenced by the notes of other jurors.
Each of you will give your notes to the bailiff each time the trial
is adjourned, and the bailiff will secure them in a folder without
looking at their contents or allowing anyone else to see them.
Your notes will be returned to you each time the trials resumes.
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will be permitted
to take your notes with you to the jury room. At the close of the
trial, after you have rendered your verdict, the notes will be collected from you and destroyed. You should not discuss your
notes with anyone, including your fellow jurors, until I instruct
you to begin deliberations.
I emphasize that notes are not entitled to any greater weight
than the memory or impression of each juror as what testimony
may have been."
Jury note-taking and questioning of witnesses should be prefaced with instructions to safeguard the trial from potential shortcomings as illustrated. Giving such instruction at the onset of the
trial and again just before the jury retires to deliberate will bring the
process up to constitutional standards and help insure an orderly
proceeding as well as a fair and just verdict.
IV.

Pros and Cons

By 1979, eleven states had laws allowing note-taking by jurors
in both state and local courts; only five states did not allow the practice. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions leave to the court's
discretion the decision whether or not to allow juror note-taking and
99. Hon. William D. Stephens, Note-Taking Jurors - Why Not?, REs GESTAE, Aug.
1981 at 406; Reece v. Simpson, 437 So.2d 68 (Ala. 1983); Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions
- Civil, 1.15; New York Pattern Jury Instructions 1:6, 1981; United States v. Rhodes, 631
F.2d 43 (5th Cir, 1980); United States v. Reibold, 557 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975); DeSanto, supra, note 96.
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questioning of witnesses.1 00 As the jury system has evolved, the demands placed upon the jury have also increased. 10 1 In addition, as
the role of the juror becomes more difficult, courts are more actively
attacking the problems of juror confusion and lack of concentration."' 2 To this end, jurors are being encouraged to take notes and
ask questions of the witness in both civil and criminal cases. 10 3
Those who favor the practice do so because jurors are involved
in lengthier trials dealing with increasingly complex issues and technical testimony. 04 The complexity of criminal cases has prompted
certain state legislatures to enact legislation to allow note-taking by
jurors in criminal trials.' 0 5 In any trial, however, whether lengthy or
brief, criminal or civil, jurors have difficulty remembering what was
said and what was presented. If instructions on the proper use of the
notes in deliberation are given, there is little chance that even the
use of incorrect notes by a juror will create grounds for a new
trial.' o6
Juror notes should be used to supplement, rather than replace a
juror's memory. When the notes and her memory are in conflict, the
juror's memory should prevail. Notes should never be used to replace
recollection, but rather to assist it.' 0 1 The greater danger of juror
error occurs when during deliberations the memory of noteless jurors
falter and they are confused as to the evidence. They then become
subject to the influence of the note-taking jurors. Although this is a
good reason for allowing juror note-taking and questioning of witnesses, the greatest support comes from the belief that this process
results in increased juror attentiveness and gives the juror a greater
sense of responsibility and participation in the trial proceedings. 08
100. Faye A. Silas, Write It Down? A.B.A. J., April 1984 at 35. The reference as to
states for or against the practice was identified by a 1979 survey by the Center for Jury
Studies.
101. Michael E. Parry, Taking Note of Note Taking, 10 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS.
565, 574, (1973-74). Parry labels this the note takers "pride of authorship."
102. Ranii, Judges Push Increased Jury Role, 4 NAT'L L.J., 49, 1982.
103. Ratton v. Busby, 326 S.W.2d 889 (Ark. 1959), deals with asking questions; People
v. Heard, 200 N.W.2d 73 (Mich. 1972), a civil case; United States v. Bertollotti, 529 F.2d 149
(2d Cir. 1975), was a criminal case where note taking was allowed.
104. Andrew Hacker, Professor at Queens College in New York City, stated, "not taking notes in a trial is like not taking notes during a college course and then being expected to
do a good job on the final examination."
105. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1137 (1949); IDAHO CODE, § 19-2203 (1947).
106. State v. Keehn, 118 P. 851 (Kan. 1911). Here a juror made a sketch which was
incorrect but was used by jurors to refresh their memory of a scene of the schoolhouse grounds
and surrounding buildings depicted during trial where a murder occurred.
107. Edwin L. Scherlis, Note Taking By Jurors, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 332, 337 (1964).
108. Leonard B. Sand, Steven A. Reiss; A Report On Seven Experiments Conducted By
District Court Judges In The Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U.L. REv. 423 (1985).
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Those who oppose the practice of jurors taking notes and asking
questions base their opposition on several arguments."0 9 One such argument is that the best note-taker (or the only note-taker) may dom-

inate jury deliberation. " 0 When memory fails or when there is disagreement as to another's recollection, people tend to give great
weight to the written word. Furthermore, the juror who takes notes
will tend to resist backing down from conflicts of memory with other
jurors even if the notes are inaccurate."' This tends to give the notetaker an unfair position over the non-note-taker during
12
deliberations.'
Another argument against note-taking is that a lay juror who
has notes to refer to may emphasize the unimportant or irrelevant
matters in her notes " and might sway the non-note-taker to neglect
more important facts not noted."" A "loss" of evidence might also
occur because of the note-takers lack of focus on the trial's "big

picture."
Courts have also argued that a juror scribbling notes may divert
the attention of non-note-taking jurors and impress upon them that
the note-taker is more informed and alert. " 5 This distraction may
also affect both note-taker and non-note-taker in that they may lose
the opportunity to observe the mannerisms of the witnesses and other
events that are occurring in the courtroom. " 6 Manifestations of
emotion and expression are important in assisting jurors to understand testimony and in determining the credibility of the witness.
A seldom-mentioned argument against note-taking is that it delays the proceeding. A few courts have reasoned that jurors who take
notes are distracted from the evidence unless time is afforded them
109. United States v. McLean, 578 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1978). However this case considered only those factors against note taking.
110. Id. McLean, on page 66 does a good job in listing the arguments against note
taking, but never determines which side of the argument prevails. The court leaves the determination to the courts on a case by case basis.
111. Parry, supra, note 78 at 566.
112. United States v. Davis, 103 F. 457, 470 (W.D. Tenn. 1900).
113. Parry, supra note 101, at 575. This point takes direct issue with the argument in
the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, 26 F.R.D. 409, 458 (1960). Here the committee reported that since lawyers and judges too notes so took should the jurors.
114. Thornton v. Weaber, 112 A.2d 344 (Pa. 1955).
115. Id. at 348. It should be noted that Pennsylvania is one of the few states that go so
far as to prohibit judges from encouraging jurors to take notes and note-taking then is generally forbidden.
116. Hasenfus v. Secord, 797 F. Supp. 958 (1989); Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 606
F. Supp. 132 (1985). These comments were made by Judge Clyde Atkins, Federal Judge for
the Southern District of Florida and presider over both the Hasenfus and Cordis trials, in a
speech given to the Inns of Court at St. Thomas University School of Law.
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to take notes.11 In addition, jurors take more notes at the beginning
of the trial than at the end,' 1 8 which may result in jurors placing
greater weight on evidence presented at the beginning of the trial.
A search for the truth is, or should be, the goal of every trial.1 1 9
Understanding the facts and laws of the case is essential to such a

search and without an adequate understanding, jurors are hampered
in the performance of their role. 120 Advocates of juror-questioning
contend that justice is better served by allowing jurors to ask questions and thus resolve any confusion they may have concerning the
testimony. The process not only clarifies the mind of a juror but
alerts trial counsel to an issue that may need to be further clarified
through more extensive development. 2 ' Results of a recent study
conducted by the American Judicature Society in 1991 reveal that
juror questioning also "better enables the jurors to understand the
' S "increases jufacts and issues,"1'22 "helps jurors get to the truth,"12
rors,' judges' and lawyers' satisfaction with the trial, the judge and
the verdict". 2 "
The practice of allowing jurors to ask questions of the witness
raises concerns similar to those raised by jury note taking. Such a
procedure may disrupt the trial, and may result in questions being
raised that unfairly prejudice one party. 2 ' Most jurors lack a legal
background and likely will not understand rules of evidence. 26 Questions posed by jurors may be improperly phrased, outside of relevant

issues, argumentative, or highly prejudicial. Counsel for each party
has an obligation to object to questions they believe to be improper. 27 Regardless of the attorney's rationale for objecting, jurors
117. Denson v. Stanley, 84 So. 770 (Ala. App. 1919). The court overruled the objection
to a juror taking down figures as to amounts testified to by various witnesses. There was a
pause to give a juror paper to make notes on. The pause was momentary and only a few notes
were made. The court said notes were okay if they did not cause an undue delay.
118. Stephens, supra note 99.
119. Michael A. McLaughlin, Questions to Witnesses and Notetaking by the Jury as
Aids in UnderstandingComplex Litigation, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 687, 697 (1982-83).
120. State v. Taylor, 544 P.2d 714 (Ariz. App. 1976). This case suggests many proponents of jury questions. The trial court has the discretion to allow jury questions, questions
from the jury are to be encouraged, and a well informed juror serves the cause of justice.
121. See supra note 116.
122. Garmel, Toward More Active Juries: Taking Notes and Asking Questions, AM.
JUDICATURE SOC. (1991).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. State v. Taylor, 544 P.2d 714 (Ariz. App. 1976). Though the court upheld the trial
court's not allowing questions it did say the matter was within the discretion of the judge and
in properly controlled situations works to have an informed jury, which is desirable.
126. People v. Knapper, 230 N.Y. App. Div. 487, 245 N.Y.S. 245 (1930); Krause v.
State, 132 P.2d 179 (Okla. Crim. 1942).
127. McLaughlin, supra note 119, at 706.
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may resent his or her efforts to prevent the question from being answered. 12 8 A juror may infer that the witness or party, or even counsel, is hiding something. It can be an embarrassing situation for
counsel,"2 9 and may prejudice his client in the eyes of the inquiring
juror.
One result of such a scenario may be that the juror will give
little or no credibility to the testimony of the witness.' Jurors may
resent the objecting litigator, which may influence their decisionmaking. Another problem is that passive jurors are not influenced by
the adversarial nature of the proceedings, however, once involved
they may lose the necessary objectivity to reach a just verdict.' 31 In
addition, "jurors may overemphasize their own questions and answers at the expense of other evidence presented during the trial."1'32
Another issue concerning jury-questioning involves the control
lawyers can exercise over the proceedings. A lawyer uses cross-examination to elicit specific answers in a specific order to make certain
points in the case. Juror questions may mitigate or obliterate these
results by re-opening the line of questioning and therefore aiding opposing counsel. Or, it may allow the attorney to hammer home her
points again and republish them to the jury thereby giving more emphasis and an unfair impression of the importance to the jury.
V.

Experiments in the Use of Jury Note-taking

Over the past several decades numerous courts have experimented with juror note-taking. One such experiment was conducted
in 1976 in the Circuit Court of Dupage County, Illinois. The study
focused upon four cases assigned to Judge Bruce R. Farwell." 3s In
two experimental groups, one criminal and one civil, consisting of
twenty-four randomly selected jurors, jurors were permitted to take
notes during the trial. In the other two cases, the control group, also
consisting of twenty-four randomly selected jurors, was not permitted to take notes. At the conclusion of each trial the participating
jurors completed "exit questionnaires" on which they recorded their
reactions to jury service and their attitudes toward juror note-tak128. Id.
129. State v. Taylor, 544 P.2d 714 (Ariz. App. 1976).
130. Krause v. State, 132 P.2d 179, 182 (Okla. Crim. 1942).
131. McLaughlin, supra note 119, at 706.
132. Garmel, supra note 122.
133. Flango, Would Jurors do a Better Job if they Could Take Notes, 65
436 (April, 1990).
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ing. T " In addition, those jurors that were permitted to take notes
answered several supplementary questions regarding the effect of the
note-taking on the decision-making process.3
The results indicated that those permitted to take notes rated
the quality of their deliberations higher than those who could not
take notes.136 The study suggested that the jurors who took notes
found cases less difficult to decide than those who did not take
notes.13 7 In addition, the attitude of note-takers regarding overall
jury service was more positive than those of non-note-takers. 3 8
Those that were allowed to take notes placed much less reliance on
other jurors than did the non-note-takers.1 39 Many of the note-taking
jurors who changed their minds during deliberations reported that
the notes of other jurors were persuasive. 14 0 The jurors observed that
the notes refreshed their memories and helped convince others of the
facts." ' Of those taking notes, one half of the jurors took notes
throughout the trial and the other half took more notes at the beginning of the trial than at the end." 2
Judge Farewell felt that the experiment was a tremendous success. He found that when note-taking was used, the verdicts were
brought in faster and there were no hung juries." 3 Judge Farwell
stated, "The biggest benefit is that the jury, while deliberating, no
longer sends out questions or wants someone's testimony read to
them.""4
In June of 1982, twenty eight federal judges throughout the second circuit began to experiment with jury note-taking. They employed one or more of seven different procedures designed to increase
the knowledge of judges, attorneys, and the public concerning jury
selection and practice. 45 One of the procedures experimented with
was simply to advise jurors that they may take notes." 6 Another per7
mitted jurors to ask questions of the witnesses."
Six of the judges permitted juror note-taking in eighteen civil
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 440.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Flango, supra note 133, at 441.
Id. at 442.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sand and Reiss, supra note 108, at 423.
Id. at 424.
Id.
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and fourteen criminal trials.148 The jurors were, however, cautioned
at the beginning of the trial and again at the end as to the proper
use of these notes.1 49 They were instructed to pay attention to the
proceedings, keep their notes private and rely on their memory, not
the notes, and to request a reading of the transcript of necessary. 150
Several judges and attorneys involved in this experiment felt
that note-taking assisted the jurors in recalling the facts and exhibits.15 In a poll of the jurors in one criminal case, seven of the twelve
jurors specifically reported that they took notes that served as a useful memory aid.1 52 Four of these jurors also remarked that one of the
principal benefits of note-taking was its usefulness in pinpointing testimony that the jurors wanted to hear again.153 In addition, two
judges and two attorneys credited juror note-taking with the absence
of any request for a reading of the record." 4 They felt that juror
note-taking improved recollection of the trial.155
Several attorneys objected to the note-taking procedures on the
grounds that it suppressed the jurors' need or desire to have certain
portions of the record read. 56 They argued that the jurors were reluctant to ask to read the transcripts and tended to rely on their
notes instead. 57 Six of the twelve jurors polled, however, expressly
stated that their note-taking had no effect on their unwillingness to
have testimony read to them by the court." 8
Some attorneys expressed a concern that the jurors who took
notes would exercise undue influence over their fellow juror and that
the notes would add to the credibility of the note-takers opinions.1 59
In a poll of jurors in three different cases, well-educated jurors took
more notes than other jurors.16 0 The judge initially felt that this
might lead to the domination of jury deliberations by the well-educated and affluent. 16 1 However, in six trials in which the note-taking
experiment was conducted, there were no unduly divisive jury
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 446.
Id.
Sand and Reiss, supra note 108, at 447.
Id. at 450.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Sand and Reiss, supra note 108, at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sand and Reiss, supra note 108, at 451.
Id.
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deliberations. 162

As has become a frequent theme in these experiments, in response to questioning regarding juror attentiveness while taking
notes, three judges and three attorneys felt that note-taking increased juror attentiveness and raised the jury's interest in the
trial.163 Some attorneys believed that note-taking during trial distracts the jury. 6" In addition, others remarked that the attention of
the jurors should be entirely on the witness in order to evaluate credibility.165 They also felt that note-taking would interfere with witness
observation. 6
As a whole, the participants in the note-taking experiments favored the procedure. The majority of the negative responses centered
around the usefulness of juror note-taking.' 6 ' Two attorneys argued
that the note-taking procedure had a certain limited value in that it
kept jurors occupied when they were bored.' 68 They also felt that
most jurors were poor note-takers. 9 Most of the judges who participated in these experiments, on the other hand, felt that the jurors as
a whole were proficient note-takers, and that even if they were not
they should be given the opportunity to take notes because, as one
judge put it, "[i]t does no harm and it may do some good."' 70
In 1985 a ten-month study regarding juror note-taking was conducted by a committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association. This
study is said to be the most comprehensive in terms of the number of
jurors surveyed and the type of questions asked. Five Judges in the
U.S. District Court for the eastern District of Pennsylvania participated in the study.' 7 1 Out of 326 jurors who participated, 228 took
notes.' 72 Approximately 96 percent of these jurors reported that the

practice was advantageous and if they were to serve on a jury again
would take notes.'7

The participants stated that note-taking helped

them remember witness testimony, provided a way of checking details of organizing information and assisted them in decision mak162.
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ing.174 In addition, of the 98 jurors who did not take notes, nearly
one third said in retrospect that they would recommend taking notes
to others who might serve on a jury. 5
Of the jurors who took notes, approximately one-half said that
their notes affected their decision. 76 However, 64 percent of the jurors reported that their note-taking counterparts did not dominate
the deliberations. 7 As a result of this experiment, other judges in
the Philadelphia District Court now give jurors the option of taking
notes.
The 1982 study in the Second Circuit also experimented with
juror-questioning. Jurors were told they would be permitted to submit written questions to the judge that they wanted asked of a witness.17 8 They were cautioned, however, that because of evidentiary
rules, some of their questions may not be asked, and that they were
not to draw any inference from that. 79 At the conclusion of each
witness' testimony, jurors were given an opportunity to submit written questions to the judge.
While this experiment drew an overall favorable response, some
expressed concern that the procedure disrupted the proceedings and
posed difficulties in objecting to the question submitted. 8 ' Those in
favor of the procedure cited increased juror attentiveness, responsibility and participation.
VI.

Legal High-Tech and the Future

What started out as only an experiment may prove to be the
standard for the constitutional basis of continuing to expand the participation of the jury in the trial process. In Chandler v. Florida,'8'
the case that has become synonymous with the use of cameras in the
courtroom, the court affirmed the constitutionality of a revised Canon of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct. 82 The newly revised
Canon permitted electronic media and still photography coverage of
judicial proceedings, subject to the control [and discretion] of the
presiding judge.' In addition, guidelines for the implementation of
174.
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177.
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180.
181.
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the Canon were promulgated with the emphasis on protecting the
184
fundamental right of the accused in a criminal case to a fair trial.
The majority in Chandler limited their decision to an approval
of the experiment which the Florida courts were conducting regarding the presence of cameras in the courtroom. Although, the majority did not enunciate a per se constitutional rule that cameras are to
be allowed in the courtrooms across America; they did, however,
state that the televising of criminal trials is not inherently a denial of
due process absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimensions. This statement was in direct response to the appellant's claim
that the Court in its previous decision of Estes v. Texas, 185 announced such a rule.
Estes was the first Supreme Court case to deal with the issue of
televising a trial. A media circus surrounded the trial. The whole
front section of the courtroom was filled with various representatives
of the television and still photography media. The television cameras
were particularly obtrusive because that medium was relatively new
and consequently there were, it seemed, miles of cable and countless
camera technicians, in contrast to the single compact videotape cameras in use today. The Texas court did remedy the problem by confining the cameras to a booth that was constructed in the rear of the
courtroom. This remedy was not .enough for the Warren court who
remained suspicious of the "mischievous potentialities for intruding
upon the detached atmosphere which should always surround the judicial process".186 The court consequently held that the televising of
that case led to an inherent denial of due process and right to a fair
trial.
The Chandler Court was quick to point out that the decision
was not an outright majority of votes by the Justices but rather it
was only a plurality secured by the vote of Justice Harlan. Justice
Harlan limited his concurrence "subject . . . to the reservations and
only to the extent indicated in [his concurrence]." While stating his
general concerns of televising of criminal trials, including the
"showboating" of the attorneys and or the pressure of the hidden
audience of television viewers, he limited his concurrence to "what
was done in this case". 187
The Chandler court reasoned that Harlan did not intend the
184.
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Estes decision to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring
photographic, radio, and television coverage in all cases and under
all circumstances. However, to the dismay of Justices Stewart and
White the Court did not overrule the Estes decision outright. The
Court in Justice White's words "reduc[es] Estes to an admonition to
proceed with some caution."1 88 Justices Stewart and White appear to
be advocating an outright approval of the use of cameras in the
courtroom assuming the judge of the tribunal insures that the accused receives a fair trial.18 9
Applying the principles of increased technology and the ever
growing practical demand for news coverage, it has become apparent
in recent months that state tribunals have interpreted Chandler as
giving them the green light to go ahead and televise trials. The William Kennedy Smith rape trial aired live through its duration on
Cable News Network (CNN). This served to spawn the nation's first
cable television network devoted solely to the televising of court
cases and legal issues: Court TV. The "cop slapping" trial of Zsa
Zsa Gabor was also extensively covered. The trial of Miami Policeman William Lozano accused of manslaughter of two black men was
televised on the local public access station and many public officials
feel its broadcast helped to alleviate further racial tensions. 19 0 The
trial of mass murderer Jeffery Dahmer, as well as former World
heavy weight boxing champ Michael Tyson, received extensive media coverage and were both televised to some extent.
After the Chahdler decision, practicality has clearly impacted
constitutionality, and no longer is such a process viewed as a constitutional denial of the litigants' rights to a fair trial. The evolution of
the issue of cameras in the courtroom may be said to parallel the
issue of more active juror participation through note taking and
questioning of witnesses in that neither has been explicitly and definitively approved by the courts, yet there is considered no denial of
due process absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimensions. With the broad interpretation of the Chandler decision some
courts have chosen to enact strict guidelines intended to insure the
litigants received a fair trial. If courts continue to take the same
approach with jury questioning and taking of notes during the trial
then appropriate safeguards as set forth in this article can be imple188.
189.
190.
Miami.
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mented uniformly which would effectively resolve any due process
problems.
VII.

Conclusion

Chiseled in stone or raised in plaster as relief in most courtrooms throughout America are these words: "We who labor here
seek only truth." Many courtrooms also add: "When the law and
common sense disagree, common sense must prevail." With the
evolution of law involving more complex issues and complicated testimony, allowing jurors the means to clarify testimony and answer
questions they have concerning the testimony seems reasonable, necessary and inevitable. The concerns of lawyers and judges in this
area should not be with the acceptance of such procedures, but
rather with implementing their use with proper constitutional
safeguards.
With proper implementation, under proper instructions, jurors
should be allowed to take notes and ask questions without fear of
bias, trial delays, and distractions to the court, lawyers, and other
jurors. Doing so will improve the quality of the trial and enhance the
juror's experience in the process, while still maintaining the constitutional right to a fair trial and just verdict. Constitutionally, there is
simply no need to sacrifice the juror's need to know for the right to a
fair trial.

